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 NOTE 
Supreme Court Decision on Juvenile 
Sentencing Results in Cruel and Unusual 
Difficulties for Missouri 
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2013). 
ANDREW T. PEEBLES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans are familiar with the phrase “cruel and unusual pun-
ishment” as it is used in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  But 
far fewer are acquainted with the history behind these words and the difficul-
ty the Supreme Court of the United States has had in giving definition to this 
broad phrase.  Since the ratification of this amendment in 1791, the Court has 
drawn and re-drawn the boundaries of what constitutes “cruel and unusual 
punishment” forbidden by the Constitution, tending to exhibit an increasing 
sense of decency in the punishments it allows for certain crimes.  Most re-
cently, the Court continued this trend by holding in Miller v. Alabama that a 
juvenile cannot be sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”) until the sen-
tencer considers certain mitigating factors, such as the youthful characteristics 
of the offender.1 
While the Court’s progress can be seen as a beneficial furtherance of ci-
vility in an increasingly advanced society, this constant change in the law 
creates havoc for the states as they struggle to amend their statutes to comply 
with the Court’s most recent decision.  After Miller, for example, twenty-nine 
states saw their mandatory sentencing statutes invalidated, requiring immedi-
ate, complicated revisions of their criminal codes.2  In Missouri, this struggle 
began when the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State v. Hart, a case ap-
plying the Miller decision to state law.3  As a result of this decision and the 
resulting invalidation of state law, Missouri’s criminal justice system faces 
several problems that must be dealt with immediately.4  To comply with the 
 
 B.A. History, University of Missouri, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2015; Missouri Law Review Associate Member, 2013-2014, Note and 
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 1. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 2. James Swift, Miller v. Alabama: One Year Later, JUV. JUST. INFO. 
EXCHANGE (June 25, 2013), http://jjie.org/miller-v-alabama-one-year-later/. 
 3. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 237-38 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (citing Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). 
 4. See id. 
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Supreme Court’s most recent Eighth Amendment decision and to resolve 
these complications, it is vital that the Missouri Legislature revise its criminal 
code in several ways.  This Note discusses those problems and provides guid-
ance to lawmakers as they attempt to adjust to the current state of the law. 
Part II gives a brief background of the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the Hart decision.  Part III discusses the history of the Eighth Amendment 
and explores the U.S. Supreme Court’s trend toward leniency in the imposi-
tion of punishments, culminating with a discussion of the Miller decision.  
Part IV delves into the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasoning behind its 
decision in Hart and the temporary sentencing procedures the court provided.  
Finally, Part V comments on the many problems currently facing Missouri’s 
criminal justice system since the implementation of the Miller decision and 
the actions that will be required by the legislature in revising the state’s crim-
inal code in order to remedy these problems. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On the evening of January 24, 2010, seventeen-year-old Laron Hart par-
ticipated in two separate armed robberies in St. Louis, Missouri.5  Hart first 
approached Ms. Hellrich while she was entering her car, demanding her purse 
and brandishing a handgun to convince her to hand it over.6  While Hart ran 
to his stolen blue Oldsmobile Cutlass to leave the scene, Hellrich quickly 
called the police.7  Shortly after this robbery and a short distance away, Hart 
jumped from his Cutlass and approached Mr. Sindelar from behind.8  Upon 
grabbing the man’s backpack, Sindelar began to struggle and call for help, 
whereupon Hart pulled out his gun and fired a single, fatal shot into Sinde-
lar’s chest.9  Hart returned to his car and drove away, leaving Sindelar to 
die.10 
The next morning, St. Louis police stopped the blue Cutlass following a 
lengthy chase through rush-hour traffic.11  Although Hart was not one of the 
occupants of the car, Hellrich’s belongings were found inside.12  Based on the 
descriptions given by Hellrich and a witness to Sindelar’s murder, police 
soon arrested Hart, who was subsequently identified by Hellrich and the eye-
witness in a police lineup.13  During a videotaped interrogation, Hart initially 
denied any involvement in the robberies.14  When confronted with evidence 
 
 5. Id. at 234. 
 6. Id. at 235. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 235-36. 
 10. Id. at 236. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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against him, however, Hart admitted to being present at both robberies, 
knowing that the robberies would occur beforehand, being outside the car and 
near the victims during both robberies, and watching an accomplice shoot 
Sindelar.15  During the interrogation, Hart consistently denied that he shot 
Sindelar.16 
At trial, Hart argued that the incriminating statements he made during 
the interrogation were compelled and he offered alibi evidence to prove that 
he was not involved in either robbery.17  The jury failed to give weight to this 
evidence and found Hart guilty of first-degree robbery and armed criminal 
action for the Hellrich robbery, and first-degree murder and armed criminal 
action for the murder of Sindelar.18  Thus, the jury found, unanimously and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hart had killed Sindelar knowingly and de-
liberately after cool reflection on the matter.19 
Since Hart had waived jury sentencing prior to trial, he chose to have 
the trial court decide his punishment if the jury found him guilty of any 
charges.20  Because Hart was ineligible for the death penalty due to his age,21 
the only other punishment for first-degree murder authorized by Missouri law 
was life in prison with no possibility of parole.22  At the conclusion of the 
sentencing hearing, Hart was sentenced to LWOP and to concurrent thirty-
year sentences.23 
Hart appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and armed crimi-
nal action to the court of appeals.24  While the appeal was pending, the U.S. 
Supreme Court announced its decision in Miller v. Alabama.25  Hart pointed 
out that Roper v. Simmons bars juvenile offenders from being sentenced to 
death26 and claimed that the recent Miller decision reaches the same conclu-
sion with respect to life sentences without parole.27  He therefore argued that 
both punishments authorized by Section 565.020 – Missouri’s first-degree 
murder statute – have been declared unconstitutional for juvenile offenders,28 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; cf. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). 
 20. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 236; cf. MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036.4(1) (2012 & Supp. 
2013). 
 21. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty 
is categorically prohibited for juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment). 
 22. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 236; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020.2 (2012). 
 23. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 236. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentenc-
ing a juvenile to life without parole without consideration of particular circumstances 
of the crime or the offender’s age and development). 
 26. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 27. Hart, 404 S.W.3d. at 237. 
 28. See generally MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). 
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and as a result of there being no valid punishment therein, the statute was 
void as applied.29  Hart argued that this fact made his conviction under the 
statute unconstitutional.30  Due to these arguments, the state moved to transfer 
the appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to Article V, Sections 3 
and 11 of the Missouri Constitution.31 
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in an opinion by Judge Paul Wilson, 
held that the trial court’s sentencing of Hart to life imprisonment without 
parole violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment.32  The court stated that the constitutional defect in Hart’s sentence for 
first-degree murder was not its length or the fact that he would be ineligible 
for parole, but that “it was imposed without any opportunity for the sen-
tencer33 to consider whether this punishment [was] just and appropriate in 
light of Hart’s age, maturity, and the other factors discussed in Miller.”34  The 
court disagreed with Hart that Section 565.020 is void of any valid punish-
ment as applied to juveniles, holding that LWOP is still a valid sentence as 
long as the factors in Miller are considered.35  The court therefore remanded 
the case to the trial court for re-sentencing for the first-degree murder convic-
tion.36  Thus, whenever a juvenile offender is convicted of first-degree mur-
der, the punishment of life imprisonment without parole is constitutionally 
permissible as long as the sentencer employs the individualized analysis re-
quired by Miller to determine whether such a punishment is just and appro-
priate under the circumstances. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  History and Text of the Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”37  When the Constitutional Con-
vention ratified this language in 1791, the framers were drawing on ideals and 
 
 29. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 237. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 236; see also MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 11 (“The supreme court shall 
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity of . . . a statute 
or provision of the constitution of this state.”). 
 32. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 238. 
 33. The Supreme Court of the United States uses the term “sentencer” in Miller 
to refer to whichever entity has the responsibility under state law to determine a de-
fendant’s sentence.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri uses the same term.  See, e.g., Deck v. State, 381 S.W.3d 339, 344 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 34. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 238. 
 35. Id. at 238-39. 
 36. Id. at 250. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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principles that can be traced back to as early as the eleventh century.38  The 
English Magna Carta of 1215 was also an important influence on the framers 
of the Constitution, serving “to inspire and justify action in liberty’s defense” 
and serving as a template for the language used in the American document.39  
But universally acknowledged as the greatest influence on the passage of the 
Eighth Amendment was Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the 
language of which was almost identical to that adopted by the framers.40 
During the late seventeenth century, England was suffering a series of 
abuses inflicted by King James II related to religious persecution and his 
plans to act as an absolute monarch.41  James II was deposed during the Glo-
rious Revolution of 1688-89 and replaced by William III and Mary II, perma-
nently establishing Parliament as the ruling power in England.42  It has been 
stated that the “[a]buses during the reign of James II . . . provided the histori-
cal background of the provisions of the [English] Bill of Rights.”43  This doc-
ument, drawn up after James II fled the country, was designed to prevent a 
reappearance of such abuses in England.44  This text, including the language 
that was to become the United States’ Eighth Amendment,45 had a profound 
effect on the American founders in 1787, men who were fighting a similar 
battle to prevent a reoccurrence of the oppression of King George III.46 
The first adoption of this language from the English Bill of Rights was 
in Virginia, where the Virginia Convention, meeting in Williamsburg in 
1776, enacted the Virginia Declaration of Rights.47  This document, passed in 
the heat of rebellion against British oppression of the American colonies, 
espoused the inherent and natural rights of men, including the right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishments.48  The Virginia Convention that ratified 
 
 38. Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins 
of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 666, 674 n.99 (2004). 
 39. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., The Magna Carta, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta/ (last visited Oct. 
4, 2014). 
 40. Rumann, supra note 38, at 666-67. 
 41. John P. Kenyon, James II, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.brita-
nnica.com/EBchecked/topic/299989/James-II (last updated June 10, 2014). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Rumann, supra note 38, at 669-70 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44. Id. at 670. 
 45. The original language read, “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  English Bill 
of Rights 1689, YALE L. SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 46. See generally Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Constitution of the United 
States: A History, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/const-
itution_history.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 47. Rumann, supra note 38, at 673. 
 48. This language is found in Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.  
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., The Virginia Declaration of Rights, NAT’L 
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the newly-formed Constitution of 1787, led by James Madison and George 
Mason, insisted that this language be included, along with additional amend-
ments that would become the Bill of Rights.49  After a heated debate among 
the colonies, the Bill of Rights, including the Eighth Amendment, was passed 
and became part of the U.S. Constitution in 1791.50 
B.  Historical Developments in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Since the ratification of the Eighth Amendment, courts have continuous-
ly reinterpreted its language.  Many of these modifications were a result of 
changing times and societal expectations, leading courts to acknowledge 
“evolving standards of decency” while setting the boundaries of the amend-
ment.51  These changes have greatly altered criminal law in the United States 
and have been the source of intense debate, especially pertaining to the impo-
sition of the death penalty.52  These changes have also been a source of diffi-
culty for states as they attempt to amend their laws to comply with the 
Court’s evolving standards while simultaneously trying to avoid a standstill 
in their criminal justice systems.  At any rate, the constant variations have 
resulted in a rich history of Eighth Amendment case law. 
In the case of State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, decided in 
1947, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed, but never explicitly held, that the 
“cruel and unusual punishments” clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to 
the states.53  Fifteen years later, however, in Robinson v. California, the Court 
expressly held that the clause was in fact incorporated and applied to the 
states.54  From this point forward, state governments would join the federal 
government in following the dictates of the Eighth Amendment, avoiding the 
imposition of any punishment determined to be “cruel and unusual.”55 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also forbidden the use of certain punish-
ments under the amendment’s language, regardless of the crime in question.  
In Wilkerson v. Utah, decided in 1878, the Court determined that drawing and 
quartering, public dissection, burning alive, and disembowelment all consti-
 
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 49. See Bernard Schwartz, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 165-66 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., expanded 
ed. 1992). 
 50. Rumann, supra note 38, at 674-79 & n.99. 
 51. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
 52. See generally James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing With Death: The Supreme 
Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2007); Frederick C. 
Millett, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in Aban-
doning Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547 (2008). 
 53. 329 U.S. 459, 462-63 (1947). 
 54. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 55. See id. 
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tuted cruel and unusual punishment disallowed by the Eighth Amendment.56  
Well over a century later, the Court determined in Atkins v. Virginia that the 
use of the death penalty for mentally handicapped offenders was barred by 
the amendment, holding that the reduced capacity of such individuals takes 
away the purposes of deterrence and retribution that accompany such a pun-
ishment.57  And more recently, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court instituted an 
unqualified prohibition against sentencing a juvenile offender to death, citing 
the “instability and emotional imbalance of young people” as a reason for its 
decision.58 
Over the years, determining what exactly constitutes “cruel and unusual 
punishment” has proved to be difficult.  The U.S. Supreme Court first ad-
dressed this issue in the case of Trop v. Dulles.59  There, the Court declared 
that the Eighth Amendment barred the punishment of expatriation for deser-
tion from the U.S. Army during wartime.60  In doing so, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren held that the Eighth Amendment’s scope is not static, and thus it must 
“draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.”61  Thus, the Court decided that interpretations of 
the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause were to be approached with an 
eye toward current societal norms and accepted behaviors.62  The amend-
ment’s language is thus not a “hollow shibboleth,” but a statement of living 
principles to be adapted to the changing times.63 
With the case of Furman v. Georgia came a more specific set of princi-
ples to determine what punishments violate the Eighth Amendment.64  In a set 
of consolidated murder and rape cases, the Court determined, in a surprising-
ly brief opinion, that the imposition of the death penalty in each case violated 
the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause.65  However, Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence revealed the real substance of the decision.  While examining in 
great detail the history and justifications for the passage of the Eighth 
Amendment, Brennan stated that there were “four principles by which we 
may determine whether a particular punishment is ‘cruel and unusual.’”66 
The primary principle, which Brennan believed formed the predicate for 
the application of the other requirements, was that “a punishment must not by 
its severity be degrading to human dignity.”67  Second, a punishment must 
 
 56. 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). 
 57. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 58. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 59. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 60. Id. at 103. 
 61. Id. at 100-01. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. at 103. 
 64. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 65. Id. at 239-40. 
 66. Id. at 281-82 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 281. 
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not be “obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion.”68  Third, a punish-
ment is barred if it is “clearly and totally rejected throughout society.”69  And 
finally, no punishment that is found to be “patently unnecessary” should be 
applied.70  In laying down these criteria for determining what constitutes a 
“cruel and unusual punishment,” Brennan expected courts to apply a cumula-
tive analysis of the implication of all four principles, expecting that these 
principles would give greater guidance when applying the Eighth Amend-
ment.71 
In 1991, in the case of Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court further ex-
plained when a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.72  In affirming 
petitioner’s conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, the 
Court held that the imposition of mandatory LWOP without the consideration 
of mitigating factors was not cruel and unusual punishment.73  In making this 
determination, the Court stated that a punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment only when a “comparison of the crime committed and the sen-
tence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”74  These 
situations, the opinion continued, would thus be “exceedingly rare.”75 
With these principles and guidelines in mind, the Court recently decided 
two cases with far-reaching implications, especially as they pertain to the 
decision in Hart.  In 2010, the Court decided the case of Graham v. Florida, 
addressing the issue of whether the punishment of life imprisonment without 
parole against a juvenile non-homicide offender violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.76  The petitioner, Graham, was sixteen years old when he committed 
armed burglary, and a Florida trial court sentenced him to probation as a re-
sult.77  When the court discovered that Graham had violated his probation by 
committing other crimes, he was found guilty of the armed burglary charges 
and sentenced to LWOP.78 
In declaring that such a punishment was “cruel and unusual,” the Court 
applied the “evolving standards of decency” test espoused in Trop.79  The 
Court held that there were two prongs to be applied in this test: (1) Evidence 
of a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue,80 and (2) the 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 73. Id. at 961, 995. 
 74. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 963 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. 560 U.S. 48, 52-53 (2010). 
 77. Id. at 53-54. 
 78. Id. at 57. 
 79. Id. at 58 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)); see also Trop 
v. Dulles, 346 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 80. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62. 
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Court’s independent judgment.81  In applying the first prong, the majority 
recognized that only eleven jurisdictions within the United States have im-
posed juvenile LWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes.82  The Court was 
thus persuaded that such sentences are “exceedingly rare” and that a national 
consensus had developed against their imposition.83 
In applying the second prong, which requires independent judicial anal-
ysis, the Court considered the culpability of the offender, the severity of the 
punishment, and whether the sentence serves legitimate “penological” justifi-
cations.84  The majority explained, as the Court did in Roper, that there are 
certain differences between juveniles and adults that make juveniles “less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.”85  These differences are juve-
niles’ lack of maturity, their increased vulnerability to negative influences, 
and the fact that their character traits are not as fully developed.86  As for the 
severity of the punishment, the Court pointed out that LWOP sentences are 
the second most severe penalty behind a sentence of death.87  Finally, the 
Court determined that such a punishment against a juvenile does not satisfy 
any of the recognized penological principles – retribution, deterrence, inca-
pacitation, or rehabilitation.88  For these reasons, the Court declared that a life 
sentence without possibility for parole for a juvenile, other than for murder, is 
“cruel and unusual punishment,” thus violating the Eighth Amendment when 
applied to a juvenile offender.89 
Most recently, the Court decided the landmark case of Miller v. Ala-
bama.90  In two consolidated cases, juveniles were convicted of murder and 
sentenced to LWOP.91  In neither case did the sentencing authorities have 
discretion to impose a different punishment, nor were they able to consider 
whether the offenders’ youth and attendant circumstances made a lesser pun-
ishment more appropriate.92  In the lower courts, both the Arkansas Supreme 
Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with arguments 
invoking the Roper rationale that mandatory sentences of LWOP for juve-
niles violated the Eighth Amendment.93  The lower courts also found that 
 
 81. Id. at 67 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) and Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436-38 (2008)). 
 82. Id. at 64. 
 83. Id. at 65-67 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)). 
 84. Id. at 67. 
 85. Id. at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 86. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
 87. Id. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring)). 
 88. Id. at 71 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opin-
ion)). 
 89. Id. at 82. 
 90. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 91. Id. at 2460. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2461, 2463. 
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such a sentence was not unduly harsh when compared with the crime com-
mitted.94 
Upon granting petitioner’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court re-
versed both convictions.95  The Court began by citing language in Roper and 
Graham, emphasizing that children are constitutionally different from adults 
for purposes of sentencing and, due to their youthful characteristics,96 are less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.97  Graham barred LWOP sentenc-
es for juveniles only for non-homicide crimes.98  However, the Court stated 
that the distinctive traits found in children are not crime-specific, but “are 
evident in the same way, and to the same degree, when (as in both cases here) 
a botched robbery turns into a killing.”99  Thus, the mandatory sentencing 
schemes found here prevent the sentencer from taking into account these im-
portant youthful characteristics and therefore contravene Graham’s founda-
tional principle: “that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juve-
nile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.”100 
As a result of this analysis of precedent, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOP for juvenile 
offenders.101  By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive 
LWOP, regardless of their age, youthful characteristics, and the nature of the 
crime, such mandatory sentencing schemes violate the principle of propor-
tionality, and thus the Eighth Amendment.102  And so, the Court held that the 
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
that might make the sentence unjust before imposing the penalty of LWOP on 
juvenile offenders.103 
Indeed, the Court’s ever-changing standards of decency regarding the 
Eighth Amendment have required states to repeatedly alter their criminal 
codes to keep up with the fluctuating law.  It was with this trend and legal 
background in mind that the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State v. 
Hart. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed the recent 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller and Roper to determine wheth-
 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 2475. 
 96. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
 97. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 
(2005) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
 98. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text. 
 99. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
 100. Id. at 2466. 
 101. Id. at 2469. 
 102. Id. at 2475. 
 103. Id. 
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er Hart’s sentence of LWOP for a murder committed when he was a minor 
violated the Eighth Amendment.  The court began by citing the relevant lan-
guage of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 565.020104 and holding that the 
language of that section was plain and unambiguous: “Because Hart was sev-
enteen years old at the time he committed this murder, the sentencer was re-
quired to sentence him to ‘either death or imprisonment for life without eligi-
bility for probation or parole.’”105  However, due to the decision in Roper, 
which barred the death penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen, Hart 
could not be sentenced to death under the Eighth Amendment.106  Thus, 
LWOP was the only punishment authorized under the Missouri statute when 
a juvenile offender committed a first-degree murder. 
The court determined that Hart’s first argument, holding that a criminal 
statute that fails to provide a valid punishment is void, was correct.107  Hart 
also argued that, since Roper eliminated the punishment of death for his 
crime, and because the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller elimi-
nated the punishment of LWOP for minors, Section 565.020 was void as ap-
plied to juvenile offenders and therefore he could not be convicted under that 
statute.108  The court held that this argument was flawed.109  The decision in 
Miller did not categorically bar the sentencing of a juvenile to LWOP but 
merely held that such a sentence was unconstitutional when there was no 
consideration of the particular circumstances of the crime or the offender’s 
age and development.110  Thus, Hart could still be sentenced to LWOP for the 
murder, but, in doing so, the procedures for sentencing outlined in Miller 
must be followed by the lower court. 
Applying Miller to the present case, the court found that “the constitu-
tional defect in Hart’s sentence for first-degree murder is not its length or the 
fact that he will not be eligible for parole.”111  Instead, Hart’s sentence violat-
ed the Eighth Amendment because it was imposed without any opportunity 
for the sentencer to consider whether the punishment was appropriate in light 
of Hart’s age, maturity, and other factors as discussed in Miller.  As a result, 
the court remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing using the indi-
vidualized analysis required to determine whether LWOP was a just sentence 
in light of Hart’s actions.112  If the sentencer determines on remand that such 
a punishment was appropriate under all of the circumstances, the sentence is 
constitutional under Miller, and Section 565.020 will have provided a consti-
 
 104. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). 
 105. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 106. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 107. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 237; see also State v. Harper, 510 S.W.2d 749, 750 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974). 
 108. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 237. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 237-38. 
 111. Id. at 238. 
 112. Id. at 238-39. 
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tutionally permissible punishment.113  If, however, the sentencer is not per-
suaded, Hart’s claim will succeed and his conviction for first-degree murder 
will not stand.114 
Finally, the court outlined the procedures for re-sentencing under Miller.  
No consensus has emerged in the wake of Miller regarding whether the state 
or defendant should bear the burden of proof or what that burden of proof 
should be.115  Thus, the court held that, until it receives further guidance, a 
juvenile offender cannot be sentenced to LWOP unless the state persuades the 
sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence is just and appropriate 
under the facts and circumstances at hand.116  If the state fails to persuade the 
sentencer of this proposition, Hart cannot receive that sentence and Section 
565.020 would be declared void as applied on the ground that it fails to pro-
vide a constitutionally valid punishment for the crime.117 
V.  COMMENT 
As a result of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s application of Miller v. 
Alabama in its recent decision in Hart, Missouri’s criminal justice system 
faces several pressing problems that must be rapidly dealt with.  Missouri’s 
current criminal code is now unsettled with regard to first-degree murder 
sentencing, leaving defense attorneys unsure of how to counsel juvenile cli-
ents facing homicide charges.  A great number of juvenile offenders previous-
ly sentenced to LWOP remain in prison,118 ready to file appeals and habeas 
petitions, but unsure about whether the new law will be applied retroactively 
in Missouri.  Additionally, as it now stands, Missouri’s criminal code only 
supplies one constitutionally permissible punishment for juveniles who have 
committed homicide, leaving open the possibility that otherwise culpable 
offenders will be able to get off with unjustifiably lighter sentences.119  In the 
face of these pressing issues, it is imperative that the Missouri Legislature 
take action by revising the current criminal code. 
 
 113. Id. at 239. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 241. 
 116. Id.; see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 289-90 (2007). 
 117. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242. 
 118. Jennifer Mann, Missouri’s Top Court Hears Two Cases of St. Louis Juveniles 
Given Life Sentences, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 30, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-s-top-court-hears-cases-of-
st-louis-juveniles/article_8d6e3310-43d8-54fb-b40d-d72c73755430.html. 
 119. Id. 
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A.  Difficulties Currently Facing Missouri’s Criminal Justice System 
“As it now stands, Miller v. Alabama has left states in disarray as to how 
to conform to the ruling.”120  Immediately following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in that landmark case, twenty-nine states faced the difficulty of 
amending their existing laws, all of which had previously mandated LWOP 
for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, to conform to the decision.121  
Missouri is among these states standing in disarray with its current criminal 
code in limbo. 
Juveniles incarcerated pursuant to mandatory sentencing schemes have 
already begun to file appeals and habeas petitions in an attempt to have their 
cases re-tried under the new law.122  However, the decision has not yet been 
made on whether the ruling in Miller will be applied retroactively in Mis-
souri, delaying a final redetermination of these cases.  Since the U.S. Su-
preme Court did not appropriately address the retroactivity of its ruling in 
Miller, the Missouri Legislature, or the Supreme Court of Missouri, must 
make a final evaluation on this issue.123  But until that point, the fate of the 
eighty-four Missouri inmates convicted before the 2012 ruling remains uncer-
tain.124  It is vital that the law be settled so that these prisoners may finally 
accept their fate or be able to challenge it. 
Additionally, public defenders and criminal defense attorneys have been 
placed in a difficult situation, unsure as to what counsel to give to juvenile 
clients facing homicide charges due to the change in the law.  As a result, 
juveniles’ sentencing determinations are continuously delayed, raising possi-
ble violations of an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial promised 
by the Sixth Amendment.125  Eric Zahnd, the Platte County prosecutor who 
also heads a statewide association for prosecuting attorneys, stated that this 
legal uncertainty “could delay or jeopardize the trials of teens accused of 
murder.”126 
In addition to the current uncertainty of Missouri’s criminal sentencing 
structure, the existing law after Miller would allow culpable juvenile murder-
ers to get away with lighter sentences than they deserve.  Missouri’s first-
degree murder statute currently provides two possible sentences: death or 
 
 120. Lauren Kinell, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States Can 
Comport With Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 148 (2013). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 149. 
 123. Sonia Mardarewich, Certainty in a World of Uncertainty: Proposing Statuto-
ry Guidance in Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without Parole, 16 SCHOLAR123, 136 
(2013). 
 124. Associated Press, Life Sentence for Juveniles in Missouri Still in Limbo, 
OZARK AREA NETWORK (May 21, 2013), http://www.ozarkareanetwork.com/localne-
ws/life-sentence-for-juveniles-in-missouri-still-in-limbo/. 
 125. See U.S. CONST. amend VI; Associated Press, supra note 124. 
 126. Associated Press, supra note 124. 
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LWOP.127  However, as the court pointed out in Hart, death has been categor-
ically eliminated as a punishment for juveniles under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roper v. Simmons.128  Additionally, a juvenile offender can no 
longer be given the mandatory sentence of LWOP following the decision in 
Miller.129  Instead, the sentencer must consider the offender’s youth and at-
tendant characteristics in deciding whether such a punishment would be just 
under the circumstances.130  Therefore, in cases where a sentencer decides 
that LWOP would not be appropriate, the juvenile murderer cannot be con-
victed for first-degree murder because a criminal statute that fails to provide a 
valid punishment is void.131  Instead, the jury would have to enter a new find-
ing that the juvenile offender is guilty of the lesser offense of second-degree 
murder under Section 565.021.132 
This result seems unjust.  By foreclosing the opportunity for the sen-
tencer to consider alternative punishments for first-degree murder, a guilty 
offender may get off more easily than he deserves.  Under Missouri’s second-
degree murder statute, the term of imprisonment could be as little as ten to 
thirty years.133  Such a term in comparison with a brutal crime committed 
seems unnecessarily short.  Additionally, evidence shows that juvenile of-
fenders become more similar to adults as they grow older, which may make 
some adolescents just as deserving of severe punishments as adults.134  As 
stated in an amicus brief filed during the Miller case, “It is quite clear that, 
despite their age, certain teenage murderers are more than capable of distin-
guishing right from wrong and fully appreciating the consequences of their 
actions.”135  Imposing lighter sentences on juveniles who have committed 
crimes equally or more terrible than those committed by adults – who, in 
some cases, may be only a few years older – is a miscarriage of justice. 
B.  Action Required by the Missouri Legislature in Revising the      
Criminal Code 
As a result of the many difficulties facing Missouri’s criminal justice 
system following Hart’s imposition of the Supreme Court’s mandate, it is 
 
 127. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). 
 128. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 236 (Mo. 2013) (en banc); see also Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 129. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See State v. Harper, 510 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). 
 132. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021.1(1) (2012). 
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011 (2012). 
 134. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the 
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 JUVENILE JUST. 15, 25 (2008), available at http://
futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/18_02_02.pdf. 
 135. Brief for National Organization of Victims of Juvenile Lifers as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 
10-9646, 10-9647). 
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urgent that the Missouri Legislature act to revise the criminal code in order to 
resolve these issues.  The court in Hart recognized that the re-sentencing pro-
cedure it had outlined could only be a temporary solution.136  “Under [the 
Missouri] constitution, only the legislature has the authority to decide wheth-
er and how to respond to Miller by authorizing additional punishments for 
juvenile offenders found guilty of first-degree murder.”137 
The Missouri Legislature attempted to revise the code to comply with 
Miller in 2013, but to no avail.138  Senator Bob Dixon, chairman of the Sen-
ate’s Judiciary Committee, proposed a measure that left LWOP as a possibil-
ity but would have also allowed a court to sentence the juvenile to a fifty-year 
prison term.139  The proposal would have made the Supreme Court’s ruling 
apply retroactively.140  However, opponents of the senator’s bill said the plan 
“would not have solved the problem because fifty years in prison amounts to 
a life sentence, violating the Court’s directive against automatic life sentences 
for juveniles.”141  The legislature could not reach agreement before adjourn-
ing.142 
The Missouri Criminal Code had not been revised for forty years before 
May 2014.143  Recent developments in the legislature coupled with the abso-
lute necessity of resolving the difficulties facing Missouri’s criminal justice 
system may mean hope for change in the near future.  A bill passed both 
houses of the legislature in April 2014 and subsequently became law.144  The 
law creates new classes of felonies and misdemeanors, augments sentences 
for deaths caused by drunk drivers, and increases the number of felony child 
molestation charges.145  These developments are hopefully the first step to 
continued revision of the criminal code, and potentially the legislature will 
soon turn its attention to Missouri’s first-degree murder provisions. 
Indeed, the revisions to the criminal code need to focus on four issues: 
authorization of additional punishments for juvenile first-degree murderers; 
consideration of mitigating factors before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP; 
retroactive application of the decision in Miller; and determination of whether 
the prosecution or defense bears the burden of proof in LWOP sentencing. 
 
 136. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 243. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Associated Press, supra note 124. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Alex Stuckey, Missouri Legislature Passes Bills Revising State Criminal 
Code, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 11, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://lakeexpo.com/
news/top_stories/article_3eba46da-c1bc-11e3-8df5-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 144. Alex Stuckey, Missouri Legislature Passes Revamp of Criminal Code, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 24, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/govt-and-politics/political-fix/missouri-legislature-passes-revamp-of-criminal-
code/article_5cc6674a-3b37-53a9-b7e0-e1a8225c78da.html. 
 145. Id. 
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Additional punishments for juveniles are required under the first-degree 
murder statute.  As stated above, the current provision only contains one con-
stitutionally permissible punishment (LWOP),146 and in some cases, after 
consideration of mitigating factors, even that punishment may not be permis-
sible.147  This leaves open the distinct possibility that the statute will be void 
as applied to certain culpable offenders, who will then receive the reduced 
sentence of second-degree murder. 
Pennsylvania’s approach to revising its laws to comply with Miller’s 
mandate is instructive as an example.  Pennsylvania’s law, enacted in 2012, 
provides for permissive sentencing of LWOP or thirty-five years of impris-
onment for juveniles convicted of murder.148  The optional punishment of 
thirty-five years of imprisonment provides a good balance, ensuring that jus-
tice is done while providing offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release.149  To ensure that juvenile murderers are receiving a punishment that 
fits the crime, Missouri should include a secondary sentence for first-degree 
murder similar to that found in Pennsylvania’s Criminal Code. 
Second, Missouri’s legislature must comply with the Court’s decision in 
Miller by expressly including a set of mitigating factors the sentencer must 
consider before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP.150  “The first and most im-
portant component of any model sentencing statute is the adoption of mitigat-
ing factors for courts to consider when sentencing juveniles convicted of 
homicidal offenses.”151  The U.S. Supreme Court held that, among other rele-
vant factors, a sentencer should consider the defendant’s age, youthful char-
acteristics, and the nature of the crime.152  Pennsylvania’s law also takes into 
account the impact of the offense on the victim and the community, the threat 
to public safety posed by the defendant, and the degree of defendant’s culpa-
bility.153  Another source of guidance is found in the Federal Sentencing Fac-
tors.154  This statute provides several important factors for courts to consider 
when determining the appropriate sentences for various crimes.  For example, 
a court should consider: 
(2) The need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 
 146. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). 
 147. See Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242. 
 148. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1 (West 2014). 
 149. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 120-21 (Iowa 2013) (holding that 
Iowa governor’s commutation of convicted juvenile murderers’ sentences to life with 
parole after sixty years did not provide a meaningful opportunity for release). 
 150. Mann, supra note 118. 
 151. Mardarewich, supra note 123, at 143. 
 152. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 153. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1(d) (West 2014). 
 154. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
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(C) To protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) To provide the defendant with needed educational or vocation-
al training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner155 
The Missouri legislature should use these sources as templates in determining 
what factors to consider in sentencing juveniles to LWOP. 
Furthermore, Missouri legislators need to decide whether or not the 
Court’s holding in Miller will apply retroactively.  The Supreme Court did 
not address the issue of retroactivity in its opinion, leaving the decision to 
each individual state to decide whether juveniles previously sentenced to 
mandatory LWOP will have the opportunity to appeal and challenge their 
sentencing.156  Retroactivity would mean a second chance for the eighty-four 
Missouri inmates who were convicted before the 2012 ruling.157  Jurisdictions 
across the country are split on this issue, but the Supreme Court has stated, 
“[O]nce a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the 
rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are 
similarly situated.”158  In reversing and remanding both juveniles’ convictions 
in Miller, the Court also seemed to imply that their decision should be applied 
in this way.  The determination on this matter is extremely important to those 
currently serving LWOP and their families, as it may mean the difference 
between a life in prison and eventual freedom. 
Finally, the Legislature needs to establish whether the state or defendant 
should bear the risk of non-persuasion in determining if LWOP is appropri-
ate, as well as the amount of proof required.  In finding that no consensus has 
emerged regarding these questions, the Supreme Court of Missouri held, 
“Until further guidance is received, a juvenile offender cannot be sentenced to 
[LWOP] for first-degree murder unless the state persuades the sentencer 
beyond a reasonable doubt that this sentence is just and appropriate under all 
the circumstances.”159  When deciding if this is the appropriate standard to 
use, the Missouri Legislature must keep in mind that, under this strictest of 
evidentiary burdens, it is more likely that an otherwise culpable juvenile of-
fender could avoid justice.  However, legislators must take into account the 
severity of the punishment of LWOP as well. 
 
 155. § 3553(a)(2). 
 156. Mardarewich, supra note 123, at 136. 
 157. Meghann Mollerus, Exclusive: Ruling Could Free 84 Juveniles Serving Life 
Without Parole, KOMU (Nov. 12, 2012; 1:20 PM), http://www.komu.com/news/excl-
usive-ruling-could-free-84-juveniles-serving-life-without-parole-37606/. 
 158. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989). 
 159. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (citing Cunningham v. California, 549 
U.S. 270, 290 (2007)) (emphasis added). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s recent application of the Miller deci-
sion in State v. Hart has resulted in several issues with the state’s criminal 
justice system that need to be addressed by the Missouri Legislature in its 
next term.  Missouri’s criminal law is currently unsettled, leaving many juve-
nile murder cases in limbo and creating a standstill in legal proceedings.  
Public defenders and criminal defense attorneys will be unable to provide 
adequate guidance to their juvenile clients until the law is revised.  Addition-
ally, offenders who were sentenced to LWOP previously are left in suspense 
as to whether the Court’s decision will apply retroactively, giving them an 
opportunity to re-try their cases under new law and avoid life imprisonment.  
As a result, the Missouri Legislature must avoid the disagreement that hin-
dered its ability to revise the relevant portions of the state’s criminal code in 
2013 in order to amend the law in four important ways.  Legislators must 
authorize additional punishments for juvenile first-degree murderers, explicit-
ly outline mitigating factors to consider before sentencing a juvenile to 
LWOP, determine the retroactivity of the decision in Miller, and resolve 
whether the prosecution or defense bears the burden of proof in LWOP sen-
tencing.  Until all of these pressing issues are resolved, Missouri’s criminal 
justice system remains at a standstill, indefinitely hindering the fundamental 
imposition of justice. 
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